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Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal
attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and
play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and
efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a ‘democratic deficit’, following their
statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a ‘multi-pronged system
of control’ is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system,
that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the
necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential ‘accountability forum’ for regulators.
The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases – the British and Swiss competition
commissions – mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage
of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory
cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.
Keywords: accountability; independence; IRAs; media; regulation
Introduction
The institutionalization of the regulatory state in Europe entailed new modes of
governance and new technologies of regulation after liberalization, privatization,
and re-regulation (Majone, 1996b; Coen and Heritier, 2005; Levi-Faur, 2005;
Gilardi, 2008; He´ritier and Eckert, 2008). Particularly since the 1990s, following
the regulatory approach promoted by the European Union (EU) and the global
trend of agencification, numerous independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were
established in member countries and at the EU level to regulate economic and
social issues, such as banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation,
railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental
protection, and personal data privacy (Thatcher, 2002c, d; Pollitt et al., 2004;
Yesilkagit, 2004; Christensen and Yesilkagit, 2006; Christensen and Laegreid,
2006a, b, 2007; Gilardi, 2008; Laegreid et al., 2008). These agencies consist of
structurally disaggregated public sector organizations with their own budgets,
defined as legal entities by public law, directed by management boards headed by
* E-mail: maggetti@ipz.uzh.ch
385
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773911000208
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:33:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
appointed chairpersons, and disposing of secretariats in charge of day-to-day reg-
ulatory tasks (Verschuere et al., 2006). They enjoy considerable public authority and
they cumulate key regulatory and policy-making competencies such as rule-making,
monitoring, sanctioning, and adjudication (Maggetti, 2009b), so that they epitomize
a mode of governance in line with the observation that ‘the real work of running
democracies is now carried out by the unelected’ (Vibert, 2007). In fact, they are
‘neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials’
(Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002). This apparent imbalance between power and
responsibility led to the identification of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the European
regulatory state (Majone, 1999, 2002; Roberts, 2001; Follesdal and Hix, 2006).
Whereas the diagnosis of the intensity of this deficit may vary, it has been observed
that governments can delegate regulatory authority to independent regulators, but
not their democratic legitimacy, leading to a ‘net loss’ of democratic legitimacy for
the political system (Majone, 1999, 2001a, 2005; Maggetti, 2009a, 2010).
In response to these considerations, it was argued that ‘majoritarian standards’
of legitimacy are not appropriate for independent regulators (Majone, 2002).
Their legitimacy should instead be appreciated with reference to alternative
standards, especially through the revivification of the concept of ‘accountability’.
Majone points repeatedly to the need for a ‘multi-pronged system of controls’ to
keep regulatory bodies accountable (Majone, 1996a, 2002). This system consists
of a variety of control mechanisms, such as (1) specification of clear and narrow
objectives; (2) oversight by governmental and parliamentary committees; (3) pro-
cedural requirements like hearings and reporting duties; (4) judicial review;
(5) professionalism and peer review; and (6) transparency and public participation.
Academic research has focused so far on the first four points, which refer to tradi-
tional accountability arrangements between bureaucracy and other branches of the
state (Schedler, 1999; Mulgan, 2000, 2003; Lodge, 2004; Verschuere et al., 2006;
Busuioc, 2009), and, to a lesser extent, to the fifth mechanism, which is distinctive of
independent bodies (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2010). Conversely, the last solution has
been either neglected or dismissed as scarcely relevant, because direct public parti-
cipation in regulatory governance is considered empirically negligible and even
normatively undesirable (Sosay, 2006). In particular, it is believed that the partici-
pation of an increased heterogeneous number of actors would undermine the
decision-making capacity of IRAs, that is, their raison d’eˆtre (Majone, 1999).
The goal of this paper is to examine another, indirect, possible venue for
securing transparency and responsiveness with regard to independent regulators,
that is, their media coverage (Arnold, 2004; Voltmer, 2010). In this context, a
specific question is explored: can the media help to hold independent regulators
accountable, in line with the observation that ‘in many countries, the media are
fast gaining power as informal forums for political accountability’ (Bovens,
2007)? The next two sections discuss the relevance of media scrutiny for the
accountability of regulators and, respectively, present some exploratory expec-
tations about the frequency and tone of media coverage. Then, these expectations
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are operationalized for two contrasted cases: the British and Swiss competition
commissions. The empirical analysis and conclusions follow. The main findings
indicate that the media coverage of agencies corresponds to that of the most
relevant policy issues and follows approximately the regulatory cycle. Further-
more, a systematic negative or positive bias in media coverage can be excluded.
Accountability and the media
Thomas Jefferson, in the spirit of the first amendment to the United States’
Constitution, famously stated that ‘the functionaries of every government have
propensities to command at will the liberty and property of their constituents. There
is no safe deposit for these but with the people themselves, nor can they be safe with
them without information. Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is
safe’ (Thomas Jefferson to Charles Yancey, 1816. ME 14:384). In this vein, recent
studies have shown that mass media are ‘by far the most important’ source of
information about officials’ performance (Arnold, 2004), representing a ‘necessary
condition’ for the existence of democratic government (Dahl, 1989) and a pre-
condition for accountability (Coglianese and Howard, 1998; Lee, 1999; Besley and
Burgess, 2001; Besley et al., 2002; Voltmer, 2010). The media can play a key role in
enabling citizens – who have imperfect information about government activities – to
monitor the actions of ministers and civil servants, leading to a government that is
more accountable and responsive to its citizens (Besley and Burgess, 2001; Besley
et al., 2002; Besley and Prat, 2006) and rendering elected politicians more
accountable (Roberts, 2002; Stro¨mberg, 2004; Louw, 2005; Snyder and Stro¨mberg,
2008).1 In particular, active and persistent media coverage encourages the formation
of an informed public opinion (O’Donnell, 1998), whereas press criticism and
support are considered crucial for obtaining justifications from governments and
civil service (Meyer, 2004). The media could theoretically provide an ‘accountability
forum’ (Bovens, 2007) that is particularly suitable for IRAs, constituting ‘one
element of a complex accountability system’ (Hodge and Coghill, 2007), which
would not hinder their independence (Majone, 1996a, 2002).
Accountability means that an actor who is in a position of responsibility in
relationship with the interests of another actor is required to give an account of
the conduct of his duties, whereas the second actor can either reward or sanction
the former (Schedler, 1999; Castiglione, 2006). Bovens underlines the fact that
accountability should be conceptualized as a social relationship between an actor
and its ‘accountability forum’, which can be an individual or a collective actor
through whom the first actor is held accountable (Bovens, 2007). Following
Bovens, in many countries, the media are fast gaining power as informal forums
1 Ideally, free media are expected to act as the societal institution that ‘contributes to public
accountability without being under the control of any other actor’ (Fox, 2000), that is, following an
endogenous logic stemming from market incentives and journalistic goals (Besley and Prat, 2006).
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for political accountability (Bovens, 2007). The media might constitute a parti-
cularly relevant accountability forum for IRAs for two reasons. First, public
communication is a requisite for the accountability of political institutions (Sar-
cinelli, 1987; Dahl, 1989), which is particularly important when policy-making
takes place behind closed doors and scarce democratic responsiveness exists
(Voltmer and Eilders, 2003). In fact, the media do guide opinion formation and
perception (de Vreese et al., 2006), especially when they cover issues that are
overly technical or with which individuals are less familiar (Zaller, 1992; Vogel,
1996; Bryant and Zillmann, 2002). This is the case of independent regulators,
whereby citizens derive most of what they know about the issues dealt with from
the media, and in turn, the media might help to ‘extend’ the accountability of
these bodies (Scott, 2000).
Second, the media represent a venue for policy-makers for the appraisal of
regulatory outcomes, performing a ‘fire-alarm’ function (McCubbins et al., 1987).
Because the political principals suffer from a structural informational dis-
advantage vis-a`-vis independent regulatory agencies, they must rely on external
sources of information to monitor whether the agency is acting according to the
predefined notion of the ‘public interest’ before eventually deciding to engage in
costly political-oversight activities (Hopenhayn and Lohmann, 1996). As such,
media coverage constitutes an important ‘linkage mechanism’ between regulatory
agencies and policy-makers (Waterman et al., 1998; Waterman and Rouse, 1999;
Carpenter, 2002), by playing a key role in communicating policy ideas and
framing issues (Coglianese and Howard, 1998). At the same time, the media affect
the setting of the political agenda (Walgrave et al., 2008), given that decision-
makers, for instrumental reasons, look for regulatory policies that reflect so-called
public opinion (Stimson et al., 1994).
Therefore, the accountability of IRAs before the media can be examined by
operationalizing the two components of the definition outlined above: on the one
hand, (1) the extent to which the media give an account of IRAs’ conduct can be
measured with the amount of media coverage with reference to the official goals
of delegation, that is, the expected credibility of regulators associated with their
supposed independence, and the aspiration of enhancing decision-making effi-
ciency thanks to their technical expertise (Majone, 1994b, 1996b, 1997a, b;
Gilardi, 2002; Moran, 2002; Thatcher, 2002a, b, c; Elgie and McMenamin, 2005;
Levi-Faur, 2005). Policy credibility is the expectation that an announced policy will
be properly carried out (Drazen and Masson, 1994) to create credible policy com-
mitments vis-a`-vis stakeholders (e.g. investors), consumers, and citizens (Shepsle,
1991). It is considered a crucial condition for solving the time-inconsistency problem
related to the political cycle (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon,
1983). Decision-making efficiency refers to the resource-saving implementation of
predetermined goals (Blu¨hdorn, 2006). That is, it involves reducing decision-
making costs by taking advantage of agencies’ expertise, while avoiding the
enactment of policies that are different from those preferred by the political
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decision-makers (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Bendor et al., 2001; Majone,
2001c).2 On the other hand, (2) the positive or the negative tone of media coverage
relating to agencies’ credibility and efficiency can be considered an important sym-
bolic sanction or reward, both of which have crucial consequences on their active-
ness, effectiveness, and prospects for survival.3 In fact, ‘not only performance but also
the perceived appearance of performance [y] challenges the organisation’s legiti-
macy and potential survival’ (Lodge, 2002).
Expectations about the media accountability of agencies
It has been noted that political communication is increasingly ‘mediated’: political
actors depend on the mass media to reach and mobilize citizens (Manin, 1996),
and citizens ever more frequently form their political opinions based on what they
learn from the news media (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Gerber, 1999; Hallin
and Mancini, 2004). Furthermore, it has been observed that the media can act as a
partially autonomous actor that shapes political institutions and informs the
public with growing independence from governments, parties, and interest groups
2 The explanatory power of these normative arguments is limited, as there is cumulative evidence
supporting the relevance of non-functional factors for the establishment of independent regulators,
drawing from organizational theory and sociological institutionalism (Gilardi, 2005; Christensen and
Yesilkagit, 2006). In particular, emulative processes and strategies for coping with political uncertainty
and blame shifting are frequently highlighted (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002; Gilardi, 2005, 2008;
Christensen and Yesilkagit, 2006). However, the official goals of delegation in terms of credibility and
efficiency represent a relevant analytical benchmark when, instead of examining why agencies are cre-
ated, the focus is on the consequences of delegating public authority to IRAs, as in the present research
study. These official goals are further relevant because, from a new institutional perspective, although
created following the dynamics of symbolic diffusion, once in place, agencies are expected to ‘take on a
life of their own’ (Pollack, 1996) and also exert a direct impact on regulatory practices (Christensen and
Lægreid, 2003).
3 The tone of the media’s coverage is particularly important from a reputational perspective. On the
one hand, the media represent a point of view that is socially relevant for building a reputation of
credibility; that is, a point of view that is relevant when regulatees, stakeholders, and the public at large
believe in the proper implementation of the announced policies and make choices based on these
expectations (Brabazon, 2000). By analogy, in the business management literature, it is widely accepted
that media-provided information affects the credibility of firms and, consequently, investors’ behaviour,
influencing performances such as price rate and stock turnover (Pollock and Rindova, 2003). In fact, the
media constitute a crucial element of the process of contagion that proceeds from the level of individual
cognition to the level of social propagation and back to that of individual cognition, transmitting the
image of the corporation through an informal network and eventually affecting its credibility (Balboni,
2008). On the other hand, the tone of the media’s evaluation of efficiency is crucial for IRAs. The media
provide a forum for debate and dissemination of information, recording evaluations, reducing infor-
mation asymmetry, and influencing the opinions of stakeholders by reputational mechanisms (Deephouse,
2000), while organizational reputation is an essential property of regulators that widely influences the
effectiveness of their actions (i.e., the factual delivery of their intended outcomes) (Blu¨hdorn, 2006).
Specifically, a reputation for efficiency allows agencies to build networks and coalitions, exert political
influence, increase their room for manoeuvre vis-a`-vis elected politicians, and reinforce their position
before those being regulated (Carpenter, 2001a, b). In addition, it is instrumental in gaining support from
interest groups concerned with regulatory reforms (Krause and Douglas, 2005).
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(Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Kepplinger, 2002; Stro¨mba¨ck and Esser, 2009).
However, one should recognize that the media are not necessarily impartial when
evaluating agencies’ functioning. On the one hand, politicians and representatives
of organized groups can try to use the media strategically to convey their points of
view. On the other hand, they also follow their commercial and/or ideological
goals. Therefore, the media are neither neutral evaluators reflecting reality nor
mere channels of communication for political actors (Stro¨mba¨ck and Esser, 2009).
They are indeed involved in the process of constructing reality and impose their
views on the story (Swanson, 1981; Mazzoleni, 1987; Altheide and Snow, 1988).
In addition, media are selective, that is, they do not cover everything that political
actors do, but do focus on those issues that have ‘the most direct impact on the
public’ (Coglianese and Howard, 1998) and on ‘important and interesting news’
(Cook, 1998). Whether the media can, however, provide the minimal conditions
to render IRAs accountable – notwithstanding the above-mentioned shortcomings
and variations in institutional settings, political-administrative factors, varieties of
media systems, and agencies’ characteristics – constitutes the main empirical
question of this article, similar to previous research on the media coverage of the
US congress (Arnold, 2004).4
As anticipated in the previous section, the first component of media account-
ability corresponds to evidence of regular media scrutiny of IRAs with reference
to their official goals, credibility, and efficiency, consistent with the ideal account
of media as watchdogs of the political process (Besley et al., 2002; Curran, 2005).
However, establishing an absolute benchmark for the level of media coverage
would be arbitrary. Instead, it can be appraised with the following three indica-
tions, which are in line with previous research on media accountability (Arnold,
2004; Voltmer, 2010): (1) the average frequency of news regarding IRAs’ cred-
ibility and efficiency should be roughly comparable to that of other politically
relevant issues; (2) given the growing role of independent regulators, the fre-
quency of media coverage, at an aggregated level, should follow a positive trend;
and (3) media attention is expected to follow the regulatory cycle: news is
expected to peak around events that are relevant for the investigated IRAs, such as
the opening of a new important inquiry or the publication of the annual report.
The other component of accountability is even trickier to detect. The solution
adopted in this article is to consider that media do apply symbolic sanctions and
rewards when they consistently use a negative or a positive tone in news stories
that have an evaluative focus regarding the credibility and efficiency of IRAs.
Three minimal expectations regarding the tone of media evaluation can be
mentioned: (4) the evaluation of agencies’ credibility should vary across cases and
not be systematically conditioned by a positive bias, which could stem from the
4 Nonetheless, the actual influence of the media on public opinion, politicians, and regulators is
beyond the scope of this piece of research, which is limited to the exploration of the subsistence of
minimal prerequisites for considering the media as a potential accountability forum for IRAs.
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widespread perception of the independent regulator as a ‘taken for granted’ orga-
nizational model and ‘socially valued’ solution for creating credible commitments
(Gilardi, 2005); (5) whereas it has been observed that political news that explicitly
evaluates performance is typically negative in tone (Kepplinger and Weißbecker,
1991; Lee, 1999; Clark, 2005), the consistent evaluation of agencies’ efficiency
requires the media to avoid an unconditional negative bias; and (6) because the
media are simultaneously the most important channel of communication for agen-
cies and its most attentive observer (Coglianese and Howard, 1998; Lee, 1999;
Besley and Burgess, 2001; Besley et al., 2002; Voltmer, 2010), the media coverage is
expected to frame IRAs’ credibility and efficiency as typical issues of general interest
and thus focus on the topics that are considered relevant for the public.
Methodology
Case selection and the logic of the comparison
Following the idea that ‘one strategy for explanation [y] would be to select
administrative systems that differ most and, from the research into those systems,
develop propositions that appear to hold true regardless of the vast differences
that may exist among the research locales’ (Peters, 2004), this examination of
media coverage aims to explore two cases for which IRAs share a medium-high
level of factual independence from politicians (Maggetti, 2007) – given that
effective delegation is a necessary precondition for the analysis – but that ideally
diverge in the other macro- and meso-conditions that might influence the media
evaluation of agencies. The aforementioned expectations can be validated or dis-
missed by comparing two cases that are situated at the two extremes of a continuum
of the expected media evaluation of credibility and efficiency: a ‘most likely’ and a
‘least likely’ case (Gerring, 2007a, b). In this way, it is possible to examine whether
the media can function as an accountability forum despite variations in political-
administrative factors, institutional settings, media systems, and agencies’ char-
acteristics. The application of this research design also allows the drawing of
conclusions based on a counterfactual case-oriented logic. For instance, if a theory is
disconfirmed even for the ‘most likely’ case, this can be considered a strong argu-
ment against that theory. Similarly, when a theory is confirmed even for the ‘least
likely’ case, it means that this theory deserves further attention and consideration
(Gerring, 2004, 2007b; Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
According to this logic, two IRAs are selected: the British competition com-
mission (CC) and the Swiss competition commission (ComCo), both established
at the beginning of the years 2000 with the official purpose of promoting ‘non-
majoritarian’ regulatory governance (Wilks and Bartle, 2002; Maggetti et al.,
2011). Competition policy is a politically salient regulatory issue for electorally
sensitive politicians (Elgie and McMenamin, 2005), when the functionalist logic of
delegation is strong (Christensen and Yesilkagit, 2006), for which media coverage of
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credibility and efficiency should be particularly accurate. In addition, media cover-
age is examined for a commensurable period of time that is sufficiently long to avoid
any potential bias because of contingent phenomena: the years 2006 and 2007.5 It is
worth stressing that the decisive argument for selecting this timeframe is reminiscent
of the regulatory issues under investigation in the two countries. A similar, huge issue
was examined in both cases: high concentration in the grocery market, which also
represents a topic that is fairly ideologically neutral on the left–right divide.6 Two
particular features of this study shall be mentioned. First, this contribution does not
deal with the reception, political impact, or organizational reactions to media eva-
luation. Second, the IRAs examined in this article are among the most media-savvy
regulators in Western Europe, whereas the contribution of media coverage to their
accountability is plausibly inferior for IRAs that work far from the media spotlight.
Therefore, the scope of the analysis is purposely limited to the media coverage of
powerful, independent, mediatized regulators in Western Europe, which are the
most important IRAs and those for which this type of accountability could be
particularly relevant. The rest of this section shows how the British CC and the Swiss
ComCo represent, respectively, a ‘most likely’ and a ‘least likely’ case in terms of the
outcomes of media evaluation in the population of West European IRAs.
To begin, these two IRAs are embedded in political-administrative systems that
are exceedingly dissimilar. Despite some recent trends towards the devolution of
political competencies, the British political system is considered the ideal type of a
majoritarian polity (Dunleavy and Margetts, 2001). The electoral system provides
each major political party the opportunity to contend for governmental positions,
with no need for grand coalitions. Once a candidate is in office, there are few
political and institutional checks and balances. Therefore, the government relies
on its majority to pass its legislative programmes and to make and implement
decisions (Norris, 2001; Armingeon, 2002). The Anglo-Saxon style of public
administration traditionally emphasizes management rather than legalism in the
performance of public tasks, a contractualist and market-oriented logic, and a career-
based professionalized civil-service system (Peters, 2004). The new public manage-
ment (NPM) reforms implied both the reinforcement of market-oriented structures
and the creation of quangos, semi-public organizations, and semi-autonomous
agencies responsible for operational management (Hood et al., 2001). At the same
5 This choice seems reasonable as Arnold’s landmark study of the media accountability of the US
congress also comprises 2 years (Arnold, 2004).
6 Specifically, the selected media reported the following issues (as percentages): in the United King-
dom, grocery markets (39%), aviation regulation (17%), TV media plurality (16%), home credit markets
(8%), book chains (6%), payment protection insurance (3%), price controls on business banks (2%),
store cards (2%), the telephone directories market (2%), and others (5%); in Switzerland, grocery
markets (41%), book markets (9%), import/export (9%), liberalization of the electricity sector (6%),
vertical cartels (6%), credit cards (3%), liberalization of the postal service (3%), telecommunications
(3%), the Zurich airport (3%), and others (17%). No particular crisis event occurred during this time
period.
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time, a tendency emerged towards the centralization of control and the use of per-
formance assessment and oversight procedures (Knill, 1998; Moran, 2003).
Conversely, the Swiss political system typically follows a consensual model,
traditionally selecting a multi-party concordance government. The decision-
making process is open, inclusive, and strongly shaped by the pre-parliamentary
phase, in which expert committees play a crucial role and political parties, interest
groups, and cantons are extensively consulted by the federal administration
(Papadopoulos, 2008). The participation of organized interests in policy formulation
and collective negotiations is institutionalized, according to neo-corporatist logic
(Armingeon, 2002; Katzenstein, 2003). According to the federal structure and the
related principle of subsidiarity, political competencies are entrusted to the lowest
possible level, especially regarding implementation (Braun, 2003). In addition to this
vertical dimension, the fragmentation of the system is increased horizontally by
frequent reliance on non-professional administrators, extra-parliamentary commis-
sions, and quasi-state organizations (Varone, 2007). NPMwas introduced to impose
a greater degree of responsibility and to evaluate the results of public actions.
However, it produced contradictory injunctions for civil servants, resulting in an
increased ‘institutional selfishness and one-purpose specialization’ that produced
even greater fragmentation, less cooperation, and poorer coordination (Emery and
Giauque, 2004; Widmer and Neuenschwander, 2004).
Besides these structural differences, it is important to deal with the meso-level
variables that might have a direct impact on the media evaluation of agencies to
operationalize the comparison of a ‘most likely’ and a ‘least likely’ case. The con-
ditions that follow will systematically predict a better media evaluation of the British
CC, in terms of credibility and/or efficiency, compared with the Swiss ComCo. First,
the British CC could enjoy more positive coverage, as it is formally more independent
than the Swiss ComCo (Gilardi, 2008). Second, the United Kingdom is a member of
the EU, which is said to have a positive impact on agencies’ activism through the
promotion of a strong regulatory approach to sustain the economic integration and
the common market (Majone, 1996b). On the contrary, because it operates in a non-
member state, the Swiss ComCo receives at best only indirect support from the EU.
Third, the use of ex-post mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the quality of reg-
ulatory outcomes, such as oversight control tools and the application of procedures
of regulatory impact assessment, might improve the agencies’ media evaluation
for regulatory efficiency. These instruments are consistently adopted in the United
Kingdom, whereas they remain comparatively underdeveloped for Swiss IRAs
(Widmer and Neuenschwander, 2004; Radaelli and De Francesco, 2007).
Fourth, the British CC is considered one of the world’s leading antitrust authorities
(GCR, 2006; Wilks, 2007). Furthermore, its analytical skills and capacities are highly
rated by peer agencies, experts, and stakeholders, according to the survey enquiries of
the Global Competition Review (five out of five stars). This might enhance its media
evaluation for both credibility and efficiency. Conversely, the Swiss ComCo is rela-
tively poorly rated (three out of five stars). Moreover, international experts frequently
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criticize it for its supposed lack of effectiveness (OECD, 2005). Fifth, the type of
political economy may also have an impact on the institutional appropriateness of the
action of regulators (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Again, the media evaluation for
credibility and efficiency should be higher for the British regulator, given that the CC
operates within a liberal market economy. Instead, the Swiss ComCo has the task of
regulating a coordinated market economy, for which the internal market is tradi-
tionally strongly cartelized. This situation could lead to interest groups and private
actors that hassle the new wave of regulation-for-competition to challenge the reg-
ulatory activity of the competition commission by undermining its reputation.
Sixth, the structure of the media field might influence media perceptions of
credibility and efficiency. Media industry concentration appears to be higher in
Switzerland, producing incentives for the national media to be more critical towards
ComCo, because the press industry might feel threatened by the regulator (Doyle,
2002). On the contrary, in the United Kingdom, the press market is larger and more
pluralist, segmented, and quite dynamic. Because there are fewer pressures for reg-
ulatory interventions, one can exclude any enduring bias against the CC for this
reason. Finally, unlike ComCo, the CC has a strong and active department of press
communication and public relations, plausibly doing its best to enhance agencies’
media evaluations of credibility and efficiency. In general, the human and financial
resources of the British CC are significantly higher than those of the Swiss ComCo
(Maggetti, 2007). All these factors increase the chances that the former agency will
perform better than the latter in terms of media evaluation of credibility and efficiency.
The assessment of media evaluation
The empirical analysis focuses on the so-called quality press. Quality newspapers
are indeed considered crucial because they influence other media, thus directly or
indirectly impacting the public (Coglianese and Howard, 1998). It is widely
recognized that the elite press reaches a much larger segment of the public by
determining issues and perspectives for the news coverage of all types of media
(Kepplinger et al., 2004).7 Editorials and commentaries are particularly important
in shaping the symbolic environment, although they are unfortunately quite
neglected in media coverage studies (Voltmer and Eilders, 2003). In fact, they
become increasingly more essential as they respond to the people’s need for
orientation (Voltmer, 1998), especially concerning ‘non-obtrusive’ issues such as
the action of regulatory agencies that cannot be experienced in everyday life (Lang
and Lang, 1984). Moreover, editorials are the articles in which the media’s own
positions are most openly and legitimately expressed (Eilders, 2000; Eilders,
2002). Therefore, a focus on editorials, commentaries, and interviews would
allow for the examination of press articles that include an explicit evaluation of
7 In addition, the perceived quality of information determines the magnitude of its effect on the prior
beliefs of readers (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006).
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the agency in a transparent and direct manner. To investigate how the media evaluate
independent regulatory agencies and their regulatory action, a measure of ‘media
favourableness’ will be created. For each newspaper, each article that mentions the
investigated agency corresponded to an observation and it was preliminarily coded
as an editorial (‘e’), comment (‘c’), or interview (‘i’). In addition, the day of the
publication was recorded. News items in which the agency was marginally cited and
ordinary articles in which the journalist referred to the agency without any judgement
or comment were excluded from the sample. Then, each article was considered
according to the explicit evaluation of two distinct elements that represent the ‘official
goals’ of delegation: the credibility and the efficiency of the related agency (Majone,
1996a, 2000; Franchino, 2002; Gilardi, 2002; Braun and Gilardi, 2006).
Each element was evaluated using four criteria: (1) autonomy from politicians,
(2) predictability of decisions, (3) status of board members, and (4) autonomy
from regulatees, with regard to credibility; and (1) public-good orientation, (2)
uniqueness of the solution, (3) organizational capability, and (4) cost–benefit
gains, with regard to efficiency. These criteria referred to a number of empirical
measurements of organizational reputation that were derived and adapted from
the literature dealing with organizational credibility and efficiency (Peters et al.,
1997; Brunetti et al., 1998; Blinder, 1999; Deephouse, 2000; Maeda and Miya-
hara, 2003; Blu¨hdorn, 2006; de Jonge et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2007; Radaelli and
De Francesco, 2007). Accordingly, each criterion can be considered as ‘con-
stitutive’ of the related element (Goertz, 2006).
Further, the code for each single criterion was assigned a place on a three-point
scale by considering whether the article explicitly referred to that criterion in a
positive, a negative, or a neutral tone (i.e. no evaluation present; not all editorials
were clearly evaluative; some were characterized by a neutral and diagnostic
tone). A positive reference to one criterion was coded a ‘1’; a negative evaluation
was coded a ‘21’; and a neutral evaluation was coded a ‘0’. In turn, each element
was nominally evaluated as positive, negative, or neutral according to the positive,
negative, or neutral value of the sum of the four criteria defining that element.
Following this approach, an article that positively evaluates IRAs’ autonomy from
politicians constitutes an instance of positive evaluation of credibility. More than
one indicator can be simultaneously present in a news article. The coding procedure
is consistent across newspapers. This information can be summarized by calculating
‘c’, the coefficient of media favourableness (Deephouse, 2000). According to
Deephouse, ‘c’ measures the relative proportion of favourable to unfavourable
articles while controlling for the overall volume of articles. Consistent with prior
research, each article is given equal weight in the measure. The formula for
calculating ‘c’ is
c ¼
ðf 2fuÞ=ðtotalÞ2; if f4 u;
0; if f ¼ u;
ðfuu2Þ=ðtotalÞ2; if u4 f
8><
>:
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where f5 the number of favourable recording units for an agency in a given time
period; u5 the number of unfavourable recording units for the agency in that
time period; and total5 the total number of recording units for the agency in that
time period. The range of this variable is 21 to 1, where 1 indicates all favourable
coverage, 21 indicates all unfavourable coverage, and 0 indicates a balance
between the two over the time period.
Empirical analysis
The dataset encompasses all editorial articles, comments, and interviews in the
daily broadsheet newspapers on the national competition commissions, during the
years 2006–2007. The selected newspapers represent the so-called quality press,
as usually defined in Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
Data
> Case 1: United Kingdom (325 articles): The Daily; Telegraph (63 articles), The
Financial Times (70 articles), The Guardian (62 articles), The Independent (64
articles), The Times (66 articles).
> Case 2: Switzerland (214 articles): 24 Heures (11 articles), Basler Zeitung
(28 articles), Der Bund (23 articles), Neue Zuercher Zeitung (54 articles), Tages
Anzeiger (55 articles), Le Temps (31 articles), Tribune de Gene`ve (12 articles).
Before the analysis, the consistency of the coding procedure was examined
through the recoding of a random sample of articles by another researcher to
establish intercoder reliability with Krippendorff’s Alpha (Krippendorff, 2004),
using the SPSS macro developed by Hayes (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007).
The result was a satisfactory level of intercoder reliability that was representative of
the population at 95%: K-ALPHA50.7194.8 Then, a principal component analysis
(PCA) was used to explore the structure of the dataset and to examine whether the
aforementioned four criteria were adequate for measuring credibility and efficiency.9
It appears that the selected criteria, although fundamentally unrelated, as expected,
tend to cluster into groups that correspond approximately to the dimensions of
credibility and efficiency as identified previously.
8 K-Alpha follows a quite demanding test of reliability, because data coding is considered reliable not
simply when the null hypothesis that agreement occurs by chance can be rejected with statistical con-
fidence, but when it is known for a fact that data will not deviate too much from perfect agreement.
According to Krippendorff (2004), there is no set answer to what constitutes a good level of reliability. A
level of 0.7 means that at least 70% of the data are perfectly coded to a degree better than chance. This
level is probably not ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ when the life of someone is directly affected, such as in
court proceedings or in some medical tests. But it can be considered good for most types of content
analyses, especially for social science research.
9 The principal component loadings are as follows: CRED25 0.987; CRED150.839; CRED45
0.843; EFFIC250.731; EFFIC45 0.655; CRED350.624; EFFIC15 0.620; EFFIC250.566.
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Results
The empirical analysis focused on six issues, in accordance with the theoretical
expectations outlined above, which correspond to the minimal prerequisites to
consider the media as a potential accountability forum for IRAs. The first three items
illustrate to what extent the media give an account of agencies’ regulatory actions;
the other three indicate the positive or the negative tone of media coverage as a form
of symbolic reward or sanction. The systematic study of a ‘most likely’ and a ‘least
likely’ case as regards news coverage – the British and Swiss competition commis-
sions – allows enhanced analytical leverage in the comparison and explores the
cross-case validity of prospects regarding agencies’ media accountability.
1) Frequency in comparison with other issues. Calculations based on data from
Pfetsch et al., allow the illustration of the annual average number of editorial
comments per newspaper regarding seven relevant policy issues: monetary politics,
agriculture, immigration, troop deployment, retirement/pensions, education, and
European integration; that is, 12.04 for the United Kingdom and 7.25 for
Switzerland (Pfetsch et al., 2004). In comparison, the average annual coverage of
the UK competition commission corresponds to 21.70 editorial comments per
newspaper, and, respectively, to 13.00 related to the Swiss competition commission.
These averages represent levels comparable to those of the most salient policy
issues, such as European integration.
2) Trend. There was an overall increase in the frequency of articles evaluating the
two competition commissions under investigation: from 137 news items in 2006
to 188 in 2007 on the UK CC, and from 70 to 142 on the Swiss ComCo (Figure 1).
More precisely, the average quarterly growth of news coverage was 12.28% in the
United Kingdom and 20.36% in Switzerland during the time period investigated.
This trend is remarkable in comparison with the activity of the media on the seven
salient policy issues studied by Pfetsch et al., which remained fairly constant over
time (Pfetsch et al., 2004). When the type of article is considered, it appears that,
Figure 1 Media coverage of the British Competition Commission and the Swiss Competition
Commission.
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on average, from 2006 to 2007, the increase is 71% for comments, 78% for
editorials, and 32% for interviews.
3) Regulatory cycle. The trend in news coverage roughly follows the agencies’
regulatory agenda, as it tended to cluster in relation to specific regulatory issues by
peaking significantly around important events, such as the beginning of an
investigation, a crucial decision, or the publication of the annual report. As indicated
by the white stars in Figure 1, 13 articles were published in the United Kingdom
when a full competition inquiry into the dominance of large British grocers was
announced (10 March 2006). The publication of another 15 articles corresponded
to the unveiling of the initial findings of the CC’s investigation on the grocery market
(24 January 2007). Eighteen articles included a sensible CC report on the large
supermarkets’ dominance (1 November 2007). In Switzerland, meanwhile, 5 articles
were published after ComCo’s decision to sanction the country’s leading
telecommunications company for abusing its dominant position (11 April 2006).
A total of nine articles were published before the disclosure of the initial position of
the Swiss ComCo on an exceptional merger in the grocery market (17 February
2007). In addition, 13 articles reported and discussed the decision made by ComCo
relative to that issue (5 September 2007). At the same time, the average tone was not
decisively contingent upon specific events, but positive or negative evaluations of
regulatory actions by the investigated competition agencies followed comparable
patterns across issues (when also controlling for newspaper type).
4) Media bias for credibility. The last row of Table 1 presents the coefficients of media
favourableness.10 According to media coverage, credibility was considered
significantly more positive for the British CC (a coefficient of media favourableness
of 0.48 or a differential between positive and negative cases of 15 percentage
points) than for the Swiss ComCo (a coefficient of 20.74 or a differential of
28%). As regards credibility, coefficients of media favourableness display absolute
values that are distant from zero, indicating that media evaluations of agencies are
consistent over news articles. In addition, Table 1 shows a good deal of ‘neutral’
articles, which is as expected according to the coding procedure.
5) Media bias for efficiency. The tone of the evaluations of the agencies’ efficiency
was almost identical in the United Kingdom and in Switzerland. In both cases,
Table 1. Media favourableness
Credibility CC Efficiency CC Credibility ComCo Efficiency ComCo
1 20 65 2 45
0 300 135 195 89
21 5 125 20 80
c 0.48 20.19 20.74 20.18
CC5British Competition Commission; ComCo5 Swiss Competition Commission.
10 Excluding the 0 in order to improve the interpretation of results.
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there were more negative articles than positive ones. The coefficient of media
favourableness was 20.19 in the United Kingdom (219%) and 20.18 (216%)
in Switzerland; therefore, the CC was evaluated slightly more negatively than
the ComCo on this dimension (but both coefficients are quite close to zero).
Figure 2 displays a scatterplot showing where the two IRAs are situated
according to the mean values of their media evaluations of credibility and
efficiency (the small bars represent the standard errors).11 This scatterplot
allows a comprehensive comparison of media evaluations of the two agencies.
As regards efficiency, the tone of media coverage is similar in both cases, and
constantly negative; instead, credibility is positively evaluated for the British
agency but negatively evaluated in the Swiss case.
6) Content. The element that received the most intensive media coverage by far
was ‘efficiency’ in both cases. Among all articles referring to credibility or
efficiency, 88% evaluated the efficiency of the British CC and 85% evaluated the
efficiency of the Swiss ComCo, respectively. Figure 3 illustrates the relevance of
each criterion of the coding for the aggregated evaluation of credibility and
efficiency, respectively. Concerning the British CC, the analysis shows that the
positive evaluation of credibility is predominantly because it is perceived as
being largely separated from politicians and organized interests. On the other
hand, its negative reputation for efficiency stems largely from a harmful
evaluation of cost–benefit gains. Pertaining to the Swiss ComCo, it appears that
Figure 2 The tone of the media coverage of the British Competition Commission and the
Swiss Competition Commission.
11 The mean values and 95% confidence intervals of the differences are as follows: Credibility of the
British CC: M50.0462; CI50.0163–0.0760. Efficiency of the British CC: M520.1785; CI520.2597
to 20.0972. Credibility of the Swiss ComCo: M520.0841; CI520.1259 to 20.0423. Efficiency of the
Swiss ComCo: M520.1636; CI520.2644 to 20.0627.
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the negative evaluation of credibility is almost entirely because it is perceived as
having scarce autonomy from those being regulated, whereas its perceived poor
efficiency derives principally from a negative evaluation of organizational
capabilities (i.e. human and financial resources) and from the perception of low
cost–benefit gains.
Discussion
The expectation that the media can function as an ‘accountability forum’
(Bovens, 2007) for IRAs finds support in the cases of the British CC and the
Swiss ComCo. To begin with, these agencies seem to be consistently scrutinized
by the media, which give account of their regulatory activities quite regularly.
(1) The coverage of the agencies in terms of the average annual number of
editorial comments per newspaper is well above the average in both countries,
in comparison with other relevant policy issues and (2) such coverage tends to
increase over time. More importantly, (3) media coverage appears roughly in
line with the regulatory cycle, with news peaks around crucial events for the
IRAs under examination: the opening of new inquiries, the publication of the
results of previous investigations, and key decisions such as important sanctions
on regulated industries.
Pertaining to the application of symbolic rewards and sanctions, the results are
also mostly in line with expectations. First, (4) a systematic positive bias for
credibility can be dismissed, given that the British CC benefits from an excellent
media evaluation of credibility, whereas the Swiss ComCo has a negative media
evaluation of credibility. Similarly, (5) the existence of a negative bias as regards
efficiency is improbable because, although persistently negative, the coefficients of
media favourableness are quite close to zero, indicating a good balance between
Figure 3 The criteria for credibility and efficiency of the British Competition Commission
and the Swiss Competition Commission.
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negative and positive evaluations. However, the fact that the average tone for
efficiency is clearly negative, even for the ‘most likely’ case of the CC, where one
would expect a greater number of positive evaluations, is quite surprising and
deserves further investigation. Finally, (6) the content of media coverage is largely
in harmony with those topics that can be considered of general interest to the
public: namely, the ‘autonomy’ of agencies as regards credibility and their
‘cost–benefit gains’ as regards efficiency.
These results are not only relevant for the literature on regulatory governance
but also indicate the analytical relevance of the concept of ‘mediatization’
(Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Kepplinger, 2002; Stro¨mba¨ck and Esser, 2009),
according to which the media are becoming social institutions that operate
according to their own logic and have an autonomous impact on political actors
and political phenomena (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Kepplinger, 2002;
Stro¨mba¨ck and Esser, 2009). Following this perspective, it seems that the growing
importance of IRAs is recognized by the news media, which report IRAs’ activity
and mediate their communication, with increasing frequency and evaluating them
according to the ‘official goals’ of delegation, in terms of credibility and efficiency,
eventually making ordinary citizens potentially more aware of what IRAs do.
Before concluding, it is fair to note that these findings are expected to account for
cases presenting similar characteristics, that is, powerful, independent, mediatized
regulators in Western Europe, and that they hold within the context of the quite
limited research goal of this article, that is, the exploration of the role that media
can play as a necessary but insufficient component in a ‘multi-pronged’
accountability system for independent regulatory agencies (Majone, 2002).
Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to assess whether the media can function as an
‘accountability forum’ (Bovens, 2007) for IRAs. With this aim, it explored
the media’s coverage of IRAs according to the official rationales that justified
decisions to delegate public authority from governments to this type of non-
majoritarian institutions: the enhancement of regulatory credibility and the
improvement of decision-making efficiency. This approach is relevant not only
because public communication is a requisite for the responsiveness of political
institutions towards citizens but also because the media represent a venue for
policy-makers for the appraisal of regulatory outcomes. The two components of
accountability – to give an account and to reward and sanction – are examined
through the comparison of a ‘most likely’ and a ‘least likely’ case among Western
European regulators (i.e. the British CC and the Swiss ComCo, respectively).
During the period investigated (2006–2007), media attention pertaining to the
regulation of competition in both countries was primarily directed towards
market concentration in the grocery sector. This quite exceptional situation
allowed the endogenizing of the possible effects of issue-specific conditions.
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The main results can be summarized as follows: IRAs seem accountable to the
media, given that the average annual coverage of the Swiss and UK competition
commissions corresponds to the level of the most salient policy issues, and, in
addition, follows a positive trend. Moreover, media attention is approximately in
line with the regulatory cycle of agencies. Concerning symbolic rewards and
sanctions by the media, the findings corroborate expectations concerning the tone
of editorial comments. Evidence indeed confirms the absence of a systematic
positive bias on credibility or a negative bias on efficiency when evaluating IRAs.
Nevertheless, the case of the CC shows that even well-endowed IRAs do not
necessarily benefit from a positive media evaluation on efficiency. It is impossible
at this stage to say whether this result stems from a misrepresentation of this
particular dimension or whether it is connected to substantial underperformances
by those IRAs under scrutiny. However, if supported by further research, these
results might defy the popular ambition of designing a structure of delegation that
simultaneously enhances regulatory credibility through independence and deci-
sion-making efficiency through the simultaneous application of ‘ex-ante’, ‘ex-
post’, or ‘ongoing’ control mechanisms. Furthermore, in line with other research
studies, this article confirms that IRAs can be formally independent and yet be
considered under control (Laegreid et al., 2008), with the application of the
appropriate ‘ex-post’ accountability mechanisms (Busuioc, 2009).
These exploratory findings are relevant not only for the burgeoning literature
on the spread of regulatory capitalism and the functioning of IRAs (Levi-Faur,
2006a, b; Gilardi, 2008) but also for the discussion regarding the accountability of
regulatory governance and the role of media in regulatory policy-making, espe-
cially regarding the so-called democratic deficit of the regulatory state. This article
offers both good and bad news to the proponents of media scrutiny as an alter-
native procedure for making independent regulators accountable and perhaps
enhancing their legitimacy, following the inappropriateness of traditional forms of
upward and downward accountability for institutions that lack input legitimacy
by design (Majone, 1994a; Scott, 2000; Lodge, 2004; Maggetti, 2009a; Maggetti,
2010). On the one hand, the media can possibly act as a proper accountability
forum that provides the public with consistent evaluations of agencies’ work. On
the other, whereas a positive media evaluation of credibility has proven attainable
under specific conditions, the corresponding evaluation of efficiency seems chimerical
for IRAs, even in the ‘most likely’ case, potentially compromising the reputation of
(some) independent regulators in the eyes of ordinary citizens.
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